

Codebook Description

Usually, a government does not simply favour or oppose international cooperation as such, but has different preferences on different negotiable aspects of the particular project of international cooperation at stake. For example, one state (say, Germany) may be willing to undertake binding multilateral commitments with as many states as possible in order to fight against international terrorism – but only against international terrorism narrowly conceived, that is Osama Bin Laden and his cronies. Another state (say, the US) may prefer more exclusive coalitions of the willing, but in order to fight terrorism in a much broader sense, *i.e.* including rogue states and ordinary criminals that might support terrorist activities.

Which of the two states is more willing to participate in international cooperation? It would seem that an answer to this question depends on the criteria adopted. Accordingly, every case study has been disaggregated into different aspects. As a matter of fact, the following three categories can be expected to occur in any empirical project of international cooperation.¹

- Preferences on substantive scope, *i.e.* with regard to the question of how many issues shall be covered by international cooperation.
- Preferences on membership range, *i.e.* with regard to the number of states that shall participate in a forum for international cooperation.
- Preferences on institutional depth, *i.e.* with regard to the degree of binding institutional commitment towards international cooperation.

On the basis of primary and secondary sources, the following set of questions was answered: Did a government support international cooperation in the first place? Did it support a substantive broadening, geographical widening, and institutional deepening of international cooperation? And what were the immediate reasons for these governmental preferences?

¹ Friedrichs, Jörg, Jordan Mihov, and Maria Popova (2005) ‘Synergies and tradeoffs in international cooperation: broadening, widening, and deepening’, [European Integration Online Papers 9 \(13\)](#).

For the purpose of formal coding, an index for the measurement of state preferences was applied. The index (Ξ) is derived from three sub-indices (Scope, Range, Depth), which measure preferences on the substantive scope, membership range, and institutional depth of international cooperation. The sub-indices are in turn derived from six parameters, which cover specific preferences with regard to particular issues concerning scope, range and depth (P2, P4, P6), combined with the more general question whether a state would like to restrict or expand the scope, range and depth of cooperation already achieved (P3, P5, P7). The six parameters are complemented by a forced-choice parameter (P1=Mindset), which measures whether a country supports an international approach to a problem in the first place.²

Mindset

P1: Does the country support an international approach to the problem?

[Yes = 1; unclear = 0; no = -1].

Preferences on Substantive Scope

P2: What is the substantive scope of the intended agreement?

[Sum of four topics with positive (=1), neutral (=0), or negative (= -1) preference]

P3: Does the country want to restrict or expand the substantive scope of an existing international regime?

[Strongly restrict = -4; restrict = -2; status quo = 0; expand = 2; strongly expand = 4]

Preferences on Membership Range

P4: What is the membership range of the intended agreement?

[Case-by-case cooperation = 0; between case-by-case cooperation and European Union = 1; European Union = 2; between European Union and universal agreement = 3; universal = 4]

P5: Does the country want to restrict or expand the membership range of an existing international regime?

[-4; -3; -2; -1; 0; 1; 2; 3; 4] (Difference between status quo and intended regime)

² The underlying assumption is that if a country is either opposed to an agreement or notoriously indifferent, then its preferences on details must be strategic and therefore irrelevant.

Preferences on Institutional Depth

P6: What is the institutional depth of the intended agreement?

[Sum of four topics with positive (=1), neutral (=0), or negative (= -1) preference]

P7: Does the country want to restrict or expand the institutional depth of an existing international regime?

[Strongly restrict = -4; restrict = -2; status quo = 0; expand = 2; strongly expand = 4]

Positive or negative values are attributed depending on whether a state supports or resists international cooperation. For reasons of convenience, the indexes and sub-indexes are scaled in the interval [-1;1]. They can be calculated via the following set of mathematical formulae, which are based on simple arithmetic average.³

$$\text{Scope} = \min[\text{Mindset}; 0.125(\text{P2} + \text{P3})]$$

$$\text{Range} = \min[\text{Mindset}; 0.125(\text{P4} + \text{P5})]$$

$$\text{Depth} = \min[\text{Mindset}; 0.125(\text{P6} + \text{P7})]$$

$$\Xi = 0.33(\text{Scope} + \text{Range} + \text{Depth})$$

³ Due to empirical and categorical specificities, there are some unavoidable problems. The parameters, none of which is interval-scaled, combine nominal (Mindset = P1) and ordinal (P2-P7) scales. Not all of them have the same interval, nor do they all have their arithmetical mean at {0}. The latter problem does also apply to the indices, which are computed from the parameters. This is typical for “within-case analysis”, where different levels of measurement are combined (James Mahoney, ‘Strategies of causal assessment in comparative historical analysis’, in James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (eds) *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 337-372, at 360-361). Since the level of measurement and format of the data is somewhat debatable, it is safe to assume that the indices and sub-indices are ordinal and not interval-scaled. Accordingly, they should be used for rank-order correlations only.